This paper focuses on the attempts by Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) to use Twitter to disseminate its online magazine, Rumiyah. It examines a dataset of 11,520 tweets mentioning Rumiyah that contained an outlink, to evaluate the success of Daesh's attempts to use Twitter as a gateway to issues of its magazine.
Key Findings • The primary tactic that Daesh employed was to post outlinks to a large number of different file-sharing sites. Most of these sites were smaller platforms, such as justpaste.it. There was no evidence of Daesh seeking to signpost Twitter users to copies of Rumiyah available from repositories maintained by researchers or NGOs.
• Twitter was effective in its response to Daesh's attempts to use its platform as a gateway to Rumiyah. The majority of outlinks to a PDF of the magazine either no longer work or meet with a requirement for a subscription and/or password. Moreover, a high proportion of the user accounts that posted outlinks to PDFs of Rumiyah were suspended and the tweets that these accounts posted received relatively few retweets. • Botnets were responsible for a significant number of the tweets. Almost one-third of the tweets were the product of the 'Reffy Botnet ' (ref.gl) . This is a URL shortener that is commonly used in networks of ill-intent. Accounts that use it are now suspended by Twitter.
• Roughly one-third of the tweets outlinked to news reports and coverage of Rumiyah. Some of this news coverage had the effect of amplifying the message contained in the magazine. This raises questions about the role of traditional news media in the dissemination of terrorist propaganda.
Summary of Recommendations
• Where possible, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) members should develop shared automated systems that use behavioural cues to block terrorist content.
•
There is a pressing need to expand membership of the GIFCT. • Dialogue is needed between the GIFCT and the news media regarding the use of social media to share news coverage that has the effect of amplifying the terrorist message.
Overview
In This paper builds on the findings of Disrupting Daesh, as well as two other publications to which some of the present authors contributed.4 The latter work focused on the profiles of Daesh throwaway disseminator accounts. It found that these accounts were mostly recently established (often less than one day old at the time of suspension). They had very few followers (sometimes none) and received few retweets. Some sought to compensate for this lack of visibility by repeat posting. Here, the focus of this paper shifts to a different aspect of Daesh's strategy with analysis of the outlinks contained in tweets mentioning Rumiyah -to learn more about the types of content these throwaway accounts outlink to, and the platforms on which this content is stored. The paper evaluates Twitter's response to Daesh's attempts to use the platform as a gateway to Rumiyah magazine and concludes by offering practical recommendations.
Methodology
Data was collected between 1 November 2016 and 31 October 2017 with Cardiff University's Sentinel research tool.5 For the purposes of the study, a tweet was included in the dataset if it satisfied the following five criteria:
(1) mentioned the term 'Rumiyah'; (2) was posted within 21 days of the release of a new issue of Rumiyah; (3) was posted from an account that used the English-language interface (US or UK); (4) contained original content (in other words, was not a retweet); and (5) contained an outlink. In addition, the publicly available user data of these posts was collected, as were the details of each post (including when it was posted), the onward distribution counts of these posts, and the account status (at the end of the data-collection period).6
The research dataset encompassed nine issues of Rumiyah.7 It contained a total of 11,520 posts. These posts contained a total of 892 distinct links and were posted by a total of 1,493 distinct user accounts.
Outlinking to Where?
The outlinks in the 11,520 posts in the dataset contained a total of 244 different hostnames. Table 1 shows the 10 most common hostnames, respectively ordered by the number of posts, the number of distinct links containing the hostname and the number of distinct users that posted the outlink. . For the purposes of this study, Sentinel functioned only as a repository of structured data supplied by the Twitter streaming application programming interface. 7. These were issues 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. Issues 1 and 2 were published before the study began. Issues 6 and 8 were excluded from the study owing to the research data capture infrastructure not collecting all relevant tweets for the entirety of the data collection period following the release of these issues. gl was used in a total of 84 distinct links. These links appeared in a total of 3,733 posts (32.4% of the posts in the dataset). Just nine user accounts were responsible for these posts (and one of these accounts only posted a single tweet).9 The tweets containing the Reffy Botnet were posted following the release of issues 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Rumiyah at an average rate of more than 50 tweets per day.
The hostname pc.cd also appeared to be connected to botnet activity. This hostname appeared in a total of 160 posts. These were all posted in the space of just over 25 hours,10 by a total of 102 distinct user accounts (whose user names were randomised collections of letters). All of these user accounts were subsequently suspended.
Outlinking to What? Table 2 breaks down the 892 distinct outlinks by the type of content each link led to. For those outlinks that no longer worked (for example, because the destination page had been removed or the hostname suspended), the type of content was determined by examining the text of both the URL and the post. Given the inherent limitations of relying on the wording of the URL and post, a distinction was drawn between categorisations in which there was a high degree of confidence and those in which there was only a moderate degree of confidence. As Table 2 shows, even after completing this process there remained a total of 29 outlinks that were so unclear that it was not possible to categorise them. Rumiyah states that killing disbelievers is a form of worship to Allah, 'even the blood of the kafir street vendor selling flowers to those passing by'.14 Below this is a photo of a market trader at a flower stall, which Rumiyah's producers had apparently taken from the trader's website. Rumiyah offers no indication of the trader's name or the location of his flower stall. By contrast, the item in Metro names the trader and states the area in which his stall is located. A simple Google search reveals that several other UK newspapers ran a similar story, including a local newspaper that named the street in which the flower stall can be found. The effect of this news coverage was thus to amplifyand, importantly, to sharpen -the message contained in Rumiyah.
Table 2 also shows that a total of 381 of the outlinks led to a PDF of Rumiyah. Of these, 307 (80.6%) were no longer available, 59 (15.5%) were behind a subscription requirement or password protection, and just 15 (3.9%) led directly to the PDF. The 381 outlinks contained a total of 48 different hostnames, which are listed in Table 3. Table 3 also shows the number of 11. There were only 22 posts that were retweeted 10 times or more. Four of these outlinked to password-protected copies of Rumiyah, one outlinked to a PDF of Rumiyah that is no longer available. The others outlinked to news items (eight posts), academic analyses (six posts) and other terrorism-related content (three posts Table 1 showed that a total of 1,736 distinct users posted links to these six hostnames. Of these, 1,722 (99.2%) had been suspended by the end of the data-collection period for this report. The second point is the ratio of posts to reposts. Between them, the 6,808 posts containing an outlink to Rumiyah received a total of just 800 reposts during the data-collection period (8.51 tweets per retweet). Together, the high suspension rate and low number of reposts indicate that Twitter was successful in frustrating efforts to use its platform to disseminate new issues of Rumiyah. Three points emerge from Table 4 . First, there is again evidence of botnet activity. While the 15 outlinks appeared in a total of 187 posts, 154 of these posts contained the same URL. These 154 tweets were all posted by different users. The names of all these users were randomised collections of numbers and letters, and all accounts had been suspended by the end of the data-collection period -although curiously the outlink remained functional. The other 14 outlinks appeared in a combined total of 33 posts. These tweets were posted by a total of 19 distinct users.16 They received just seven retweets.
Outlinks to Openly Available PDFs of Rumiyah
Second, the fact that 12 of the user accounts remain extant is not necessarily indicative of a failure on Twitter's part to enforce its terms of service, which prohibit promoting and recruiting for a violent extremist group. In accordance with this, the accounts of non-Daesh sympathisers who posted outlinks to the group's magazine (for example, for research purposes or general interest) were not suspended.
Third, it is noteworthy that four of the URLs in Table 4 outlink to repositories maintained by researchers (and a fifth outlinked to a repository maintained by an NGO, the Clarion Project). Three of these URLs outlinked to the website jihadology.net.17 This site has received much scrutiny in recent months, with reports that the UK government urged WordPress.com to place the site's contents behind password protection or close it altogether.18 However, in terms of the specific study for this report, it seems clear that Daesh sympathisers did not seek to use Twitter to signpost users to copies of Rumiyah on jihadology.net. Not only were there only five posts containing outlinks to jihadology.net in the entire dataset of 11,520 tweets -with these five posts receiving a total of just one retweet during the data-collection period -but none of these five tweets was posted by a Daesh sympathiser.19
The fourth URL outlinked to the site pietervanostaeyen.com. This site is also hosted by WordPress.com, but is password protected. Users are required 16 . The figures in the relevant column in Table 4 add up to 21. The reason for this apparent disparity is that there were two users that shared more than one of the outlinks. The same user shared both of the outlinks to reddit.com, and another user shared two distinct links to jihadology.net. 17. The two links using the hostname azelin.files.wordpress.com, plus the one using jihadology.net. 18. David Bond, 'How Extremist Videos are Hitting UK Relations with US Tech Groups', Financial Times, 3 December 2018. It should be noted that the GIFCT has funded Tech Against Terrorism to develop a new interface for jihadology.net, to ensure that particularly sensitive content is only accessible to users with registered academic/research, governmental, journalistic or humanitarian email addresses. 19. The three users that posted these five tweets were two academic researchers and an individual tweeting in a personal capacity.
to register for an account. In spite of this, the outlink collected led directly to a PDF of an issue of Rumiyah without requiring a password.20 Moreover, the owner has in any event publicly stated that he approves every request he receives for access to the website, explaining that he lacks the capacity to vet those who request access.21 This raises doubts about whether the introduction of password protection on jihadology.net would in fact limit the availability of the materials it contains, in the absence of sufficient resources to vet access requests properly.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The aim of this study was to examine in more detail Daesh's attempts to use throwaway accounts to signpost users to copies of its magazine, Rumiyah, on other platforms, to evaluate the extent to which Twitter operates as a gateway to the magazine. Ample evidence was found of Daesh employing this tactic. There were outlinks to a large number of different file-sharing sites, most of which were smaller platforms, although, interestingly, there was no evidence of Daesh seeking to signpost Twitter users to copies of Rumiyah that are freely available from repositories maintained by researchers or NGOs. Twitter's response to Daesh's attempts to use the platform as a gateway to Rumiyah appeared effective. The vast majority of outlinks to a PDF of the magazine either no longer work or are met with a requirement for a subscription and/or password. Moreover, a high proportion of the user accounts that posted outlinks to PDFs of Rumiyah were suspended and the tweets that these accounts posted received relatively few retweets.
In the light of these findings, the following recommendations are offered:
• Larger social media companies have automated means that employ behavioural cues to block content (for example, abnormal posting volume or using trending hashtags to gain attention). This is valuable in the present context, given the finding that botnet activity played a significant role in efforts to disseminate Rumiyah. By contrast, many smaller companies rely exclusively on humans to use content-based cues to identify and remove terrorist content. Where possible, GIFCT members should develop shared automated systems that use behavioural cues to block terrorist content.
•
There is a pressing need to expand membership of the GIFCT. At present the GIFCT has 14 members, a small number in comparison to the 244 different hostnames contained in the research dataset. 
